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Abstract
We study the optimal contract choice of an upstream monopolist producing an essential
input that may sell to two vertically differentiated downstream firms. The upstream
supplier can offer an exclusive contract to one of the firms or non-exclusive contracts
to both firms. Each of the latter can be made contingent or not on the breakdown
of the negotiations between the upstream supplier and the rival downstream firm. The
distribution of bargaining power during the contract terms negotiations is the main driving
force of the monopolist’s choices. A powerful supplier always opts for an exclusive contract.
By contrast, a weaker supplier offers non-exclusive contracts and makes each of them
contingent or non-contingent such as to guarantee the most favorable outside option in
its negotiations. Our main results hold under an horizontally differentiated downstream
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1 Introduction
The bulk of final products in the market has passed through various production stages. Verti-
cal relations, and in particular vertical contracting, is thus of crucial importance for the final
good prices, the profitability of firms along the vertical supply chain, the consumer surplus
and the social welfare. Vertical contracting refers not only to the type of contracts used in
the trading between upstream and downstream firms, but also to the process via which the
specific contractual terms are determined. There is a variety of contract types used in the real
world. In some industries firms use simple linear wholesale price contracts in their trading, yet
in others the contract types are more complicated.1 In addition, there is strong evidence that
the trading terms of these contracts are negotiated among upstream and downstream firms.2
This is mainly due to the recently observed increased concentration in many downstream
sectors that has transformed downstream firms to powerful actors.3
In this paper we investigate the optimal contact choices of an upstream monopolist that
may sell an essential input to downstream firms that produce vertically differentiated prod-
ucts. Once the contracts have been selected, their terms are negotiated between the upstream
supplier and the downstream firm(s). Assuming that contracts take the form of two-part
tariffs, we inquire into the following issues. Does the upstream supplier have incentives to
foreclose one of the downstream firms by offering an exclusive contract to the other firm?
And if so, the foreclosed firm will be the high- or the low-quality one? When the upstream
firm offers non-exclusive contracts to both downstream firms, what will be the specific type of
these contracts? Under what conditions, will it offer a contingent contract that allows renego-
tiation of contract terms with one downstream firm in case of breakdown in the negotiations
with the other one?4 Or when will it offer a non-contingent contract not allowing for such
renegotiations? What are the market and societal implications of the upstream monopolist
contract configuration selection?
We consider a vertically related industry with an upstream monopolist and (potentially)
two downstream firms. The upstream supplier produces an essential input that sells to one
or both downstream firms, depending on its decision at the outset of the game to offer an
exclusive or two non-exclusive contracts, respectively. The downstream firms are endowed
1For empirical studies regarding the contract types used see e.g., Villas-Boas (2007), Thanassoulis and
Smith (2009) and Bonnet and Dubois (2010). In addition, in the case of grocery retailing anecdotal evidence
indicates the use of very complex contracts that avoid double marginalization (see Inderst and Mazzarotto,
2008).
2For evidence of bargaining among milk suppliers and supermarkets see Thanassoulis and Smith (2009). In
addition, there is evidence that large retailers, such as Wal-Mart bargain with product suppliers, large book
retailers, such as Barnes & Noble, bargain with publishers, large tour operators bargain with hotels.
3The increase in downstream concentration has been noted in a number of policy reports (see e.g. European
Commission, 1999, OECD, 1999, and FTC, 2001).
4According to (Bazerman and Gillespie, 1998, p. 155), “the terms of a contingent contract are not finalized
until the uncertain event in question–the contingency–takes place.”
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with different technologies that allow the production of different output qualities using the
same input (see Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1983).5 If the upstream
supplier chooses to offer contracts to both downstream firms, it must also decide whether
each of them is contingent or non-contingent. A contingent contract is more flexible and
allows negotiating parties to set different contractual terms in case of agreement and in case
of disagreement in the rival bargaining pair. This flexibility is absent under a non-contingent
contract.
We study a three-stage game with observable actions. In the first stage, the upstream
monopolist decides to offer an exclusive contract or two non-exclusive ones. In the former case,
it also decides to which of the downstream firms to make the offer. In the latter case, it also
decides the configuration of contracts to be offered, i.e., two contingent, two non-contingent,
or mixed (one contingent and another non-contingent) contracts. In legal terms, this can be
materialized by using a letter of intent wherewith the upstream firm sets out its intentions
about the number and type of contractual relations to enter.6 In the second stage, negotiations
over contract terms take place between the upstream monopolist and the downstream firm(s).
In case of non-exclusive contracts, these negotiations take place simultaneously and separately
between the upstream supplier and each of the downstream firms. In the last stage, under
non-exclusive contracts, the downstream firms compete in the market by selecting their prices
or their quantities; under an exclusive contract, the downstream monopolist sets its price.
As the alternative types of non-exclusive contracts are central in our analysis, a discussion
in detail of their features will be of great help for the sequel. A non-exclusive contract signed
between the upstream supplier and a downstream firm can be of two types: contingent and
non-contingent. A contingent contract contains specific terms in the event of a breakdown in
the negotiations in the rival bargaining pair. An immediate consequence is that the outside
options for the negotiating firms fully internalize the implications of the negotiation failure
in the rival pair. By contrast, a non-contingent contract does not allow for renegotiation of
contract terms in case of a breakdown in the negotiations in the rival bargaining pair. As a
consequence, the outside options for the negotiating firms are determined by their equilibrium
contractual terms.Therefore, the crucial difference between the two types of non-exclusive
contracts lies on the outside options that are attributed to negotiating parties under each of
them (see e.g., Milliou and Petrakis (2007)).
5For instance, one of the downstream firms has a proprietary technology that allows it to increase at no
cost the quality of its good.
6With a letter of intent, a party sets forth its intention to sign a contract in the circumstances reported in
the letter. It is worth noticing that “A letter of intent is not itself a formal contract but certain of its provisions
(e.g. concerning payment for any work completed) may nevertheless be enforceable. Letters of intent are widely
used in the UK construction industry, where their usual purpose is to encourage a contractor to begin work
on a time-sensitive project before legal formalities have been completed. Recent case law suggests that the
courts are increasingly willing to find that a letter of intent constitutes a binding contract, provided that all
necessary elements of a contract are present [. . . ]” Law (2016).
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Our analysis highlights the role of the bargaining power distribution between the upstream
supplier and each of the downstream firms for the optimal selection of contracts. In particu-
lar, when the upstream supplier is quite powerful, it offers an exclusive contract to the high
quality downstream firm, whereas it selects two non-exclusive contracts when its bargaining
power is not too high. The upstream supplier faces the following trade-off when selecting
between an exclusive and two non-exclusive contracts. Under an exclusive contract, competi-
tion downstream is absent altogether, therefore, under two-part tariff contracts, the vertically
integrated structure outcome is obtained. Yet, the upstream supplier’s outside option (i.e.,
its profits when the negotiations with the downstream firm break down) is nil in this case.
This entails that its share of the vertically integrated entity’s profits is proportional to the
upstream bargaining power. The lower the latter, the smaller the profit that the upstream
supplier is able to extract. By contrast, with non-exclusive contracts that are negotiated si-
multaneously and separately, competition downstream erodes part of the aggregate producer
surplus (O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992). Yet, with non-exclusive contracts, the upstream sup-
plier may have a stronger bargaining position, i.e., it may enjoy positive outside options in
its negotiations with the downstream firms, for any level of its bargaining power. A powerful
upstream firm can extract most of the vertically integrated structure’s profit and prefers, thus,
to avoid creating downstream competition that reduces the aggregate producers surplus. In
addition, as the production of the high-quality good generates a higher surplus, the upstream
opts to offer the contract to the high quality downstream firm. In this way, the upstream
supplier forecloses the low-quality firm.
As the upstream supplier becomes less powerful, it can extract a lower share of the verti-
cally integrated structure. Nonetheless, by offering two non-exclusive contracts, the upstream
supplier can enjoy a stronger bargaining position through the creation of outside options in its
negotiations with the downstream firms (of course, this comes at the cost of reducing the ag-
gregate producer surplus due to downstream competition). In particular, for “intermediate”
levels of bargaining power, the upstream firm opts for two non-exclusive, contingent contracts,
whereas for even lower values of it, it offers a non-contingent contract to the high-quality down-
stream firm and a contingent contract to the low-quality one. Finally, an upstream supplier
with quite low bargaining power opts for two non-exclusive, non-contingent contracts. As dis-
cussed above, a contingent contract is more flexible in the sense that it allows a negotiating
pair to specify different contract terms in case of agreement and in case of disagreement in the
rival bargaining pair. This translates into higher outside options for the upstream supplier
under contingent than under non-contingent contracts, but only if its bargaining power is not
too low. The opposite holds for lower values of the upstream bargaining power, in which case
the upstream supplier opts for one or two non-contingent contracts. In the mixed contract
configuration, the non-contingent contract is always offered to the high-quality firm. In this
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way, the upstream supplier enjoys the largest outside options once again. Finally, our analy-
sis reveals that the degree of vertical product differentiation affects the upstream supplier’s
choice of the configuration of non-exclusive contracts. In particular, as the goods become less
differentiated, the range of parameters for which the upstream supplier offers mixed contracts
shrinks; moreover, that non-contingent contracts are more often selected when the product
differentiation takes intermediate values.
Interestingly, the fixed fees of the equilibrium non-exclusive contracts are sometimes neg-
ative, i.e., the upstream supplier pays “slotting allowances” (Shaffer, 1991; Marx and Shaffer,
2010) to one or both downstream firms. This is always true when the upstream supplier offers
two non-contingent contracts. It is also true under contingent and mixed contracts as long as
the upstream bargaining power is low enough. Surprisingly, under some circumstances, the
contract offered to the low-quality firm generates an overall loss for the upstream supplier.
This loss is however covered by a substantial gain for the upstream supplier that so enjoys a
stronger bargaining position vis-a`-vis the high-quality downstream firm.
Our main findings carry on, to a major extent, when downstream firms compete in quanti-
ties, instead of prices. There are, however, two points of departure. First, two non-exclusive,
non-contingent contracts are never observed in equilibrium. This is because the outside op-
tions they imply for the upstream supplier are lower than under contingent contracts, con-
firming thus the intuition of the price setting market. And second, the degree of vertical
product differentiation now plays a crucial role. Mixed contracts are never observed in equi-
librium when the goods are not differentiated enough . Moreover, an exclusive contract to
the high-quality firm is selected by the upstream supplier even if its bargaining power is low,
provided that the goods are not too differentiated.
Finally, we show that our main findings are not specific to the vertical product differen-
tiation setup, but hold also in an horizontally differentiated model in which a representative
consumer has a Bowley (1924), Spence (1976), Dixit (1979) utility function. The main depart-
ing point in this case is that exclusive contracts are observed in equilibrium only if the goods
are close substitutes. When the goods are poor substitutes, the upstream supplier prefers
to strengthen its bargaining position by offering non-exclusive, contingent contracts to both
downstream firms.
Our paper connects to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the litera-
ture on vertical contracting. A main theme within this literature is the commitment problem
that arises for an upstream monopolist when it trades with multiple competing downstream
firms (see, e.g. Horn and Wolinsky, 1988; O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992; McAfee and Schwartz,
1994, 1995; Rey and Verge´, 2004). These papers, however, do not consider the optimal choice
of contracts offered by the upstream supplier to the downstream firms. Our paper undertakes
this task and highlights the differential impact of contingent and non-contingent, non-exclusive
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contracts on the severity of the upstream monopolist’s commitment problem. Based on that,
we are able to identify conditions under which an upstream monopolist offers an exclusive or
two non-exclusive contracts, and within the non-exclusive contracts when it offers contingent,
non-contingent and mixed contracts to the downstream firms.
It also contributes to the literature on the effects of countervailing buyer power (see, e.g.
Inderst and Wey, 2003, 2007). More closely related to our analysis is the paper by Milliou
and Petrakis (2007). Their focus is on merger incentives when upstream supplier(s) choose(s)
optimally the contracts to be offered to the downstream firms. They consider the choice
between wholesale price and two-part tariff contracts, assuming though that these contracts
are non-contingent. By contrast, we consider two-part tariff contracts and highlight that the
contingency or non-contingency of their terms is crucial for the selection of contracts by the
upstream monopolist. As in Milliou and Petrakis (2007), upstream and downstream firms ne-
gotiate over contract terms, with the bargaining power distribution among negotiating parties
to be exogenously given.7 Further, Miklo´s-Thal et al. (2011) consider powerful downstream
retailers offering take-it-or-leave-it contracts to an upstream supplier that may be contin-
gent on an exclusive relationship, and show that contingency may lead to the replication of
monopoly outcomes. From another standpoint, Iozzi and Valletti (2014) delve into the role of
the observability of negotiations breakdown in determining the outside option of an upstream
supplier facing multiple downstream retailers, when negotiations are determined through the
generalized Nash bargaining solution.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on vertical foreclosure. Hart and Tirole (1990),
O’Brien and Shaffer (1992), and McAfee and Schwartz (1994) show that under secret contract-
ing, exclusive agreements or vertical integration can help a dominant supplier to reestablish
its market power. Rey and Tirole (2007) provide an excellent overview on vertical foreclosure
and stress the anticompetitive motives for upstream firms to use exclusive agreements and
vertical mergers in order to foreclose downstream firms. The received literature, however,
does not consider vertically differentiated industries. In line with this literature, we show
that an upstream monopolist opts for an exclusive contract with the high-quality downstream
firm, thus foreclosing the low-quality one, in order to restore its market power. Nevertheless,
this is optimal for the supplier only when its bargaining power is sufficiently high. Otherwise,
the upstream supplier has incentive to keep both competing downstream firms in the market.
Finally, our paper contributes to the debate regarding the choice of a firm to offer or not
a pooling or a separating menu in markets of vertical product differentiation, see Acharyya
(1998), Bacchiega et al. (2013) and Chambolle and Villas-Boas (2015). These papers consider
either a monopolist selling to heterogeneous consumers different qualities of a good or two
7In a different vein, Alipranti et al (2014), assuming negotiations over two-part tariff non-contingent con-
tracts between an upstream supplier and two downstream firms, compare Cournot and Bertrand downstream
competition.
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upstream suppliers offering different qualities of products to a monopolist retailer or to two
competing retailers. In contrast, we assume that the downstream market is vertically differen-
tiated, whereas the essential input produced by the upstream supplier is homogeneous. In line
with this literature, we identify circumstances under which the upstream monopolist offers the
same or different types of non-exclusive contracts to both downstream firms. In particular,
when the upstream bargaining power is relatively low (but not too low), the supplier opts for
a contingent contract to the low-quality downstream firm and a non-contingent contract to
the high-quality one.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Section
3 explores the various contractual choices and Section 4 performs the contractual choice
equilibrium analysis. Section 5 discusses the equilibrium outcomes. Section 6 explores the
robustness of our results. Finally, Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Firms and market structure
Consider an upstream monopolist, denoted by U , producing at no cost an essential input
that may sell to two downstream firms. Downstream firms use this input to produce, on a
one-to-one basis, a final good. Besides the input costs, downstream firms incur no additional
production costs. One of these firms has a proprietary technology that allows it to increase
at no cost the quality of its good. Denote the latter “high-quality good” and the downstream
producer “high-quality firm”, Dh. The other downstream firm, the “low-quality firm”, Dl,
does not dispose such a technology and thus produces the “basic” version of the good, i.e., the
“low-quality good”. The upstream monopolist decides whether to offer an exclusive supply
contract and if so, to which of the downstream firms to make the offer. Under an exclusive
contract the upstream monopolist commits to trade with one downstream firm alone, therefore
the downstream market is a monopoly.
By contrast, if the upstream supplier chooses to sign non-exclusive contracts, it trades
with both downstream firms and thus the downstream market is a vertically differentiated
duopoly. Non-exclusive contracts can be of two types: non-contingent and contingent. Con-
tingent contracts allow bargaining partners U and Di to renegotiate the contract in case of
disagreement between U and Dj . Under non-contingent contracts, the bargaining partners
should stick to their negotiated contract terms under all contingencies. The upstream supplier
8From a broader perspective, our viewpoint of contract contingency as an instrument to affect the bargaining
position of the negotiating parties is alternative to those suggested in the economic literature, in which contract
contingency is seen as a tool to reduce the incompleteness of contracts (see, e.g. Hart and Holmstro¨m, 1987),
and in the management literature, in which it is seen as a tool to share risks (Byialogorsky and Gerstner,
2004).
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decides which type of non-exclusive contract to offer to each downstream firm.9
Vertical contracts are non-linear and in particular, take the form of two-part tariffs, and
are bargained between the upstream monopolist and the downstream firm(s). During the
contract negotiations, the bargaining power of U and Di, i = h, l, are µ and 1−µ, 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1,
respectively.
2.2 Demand
A continuum of heterogeneous consumers of unit mass is uniformly distributed with unitary
density over the interval [0, 1]. A consumer θ, θ ∈ [0, 1], is characterized by the indirect utility
function
U(θ, ui) =
θui − pi when buying one unit of good i,0 otherwise (1)
where ui is the (given) quality level of good i and pi is its price. Remember that ui only
depends upon the downstream firm selling the good.
Under an exclusive contract, there is only one good available in the market. Using the
standard marginal consumer approach, its demand is
Dm(pm) = 1− pm
ui
, (2)
where the subscript m indicates “downstream monopoly” and i = h, l, depending on which
downstream firm the supply contract has been signed with. In this case, the consumer surplus
is
CSm(pm) =
∫ 1
pm
ui
(θui − pm)dθ. (3)
Under non-exclusive contracts, two goods are available in the market. Using again the stan-
dard marginal consumer approach,10 their demands are
Dh(ph, pl) = 1− ph − pl
uh − ul , Dl(ph, pl) =
ph − pl
uh − ul −
pl
ul
, (4)
with uh > ul > 0 being the quality levels of the two goods. The consumers surplus is
9This may be materialized by writing a letter of intent which contains the number and - in case of non
exclusivity - the type of contractual relationships which the upstream supplier is willing to enter. Contracts
may then be made contingent by including in such letters the appropriate conditions precedent.
10The consumer which is indifferent between buying the high or the low quality good is determined by
θhluh − ph = θhlul − pl; and the consumer which is indifferent between buying the low quality good or not
buying at all is determined by θl0ul − pl = 0.
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CS(ph, pl) ≡
∫ ph−pl
uh−ul
pl
ul
(θul − pl)dθ +
∫ 1
ph−pl
uh−ul
(θuh − ph)dθ. (5)
2.3 Timing
We consider a three-stage game with observable actions. At the first stage, the upstream
supplier decides whether to offer an exclusive contract, and if so, to which of the downstream
firms. If, instead, it decides to offer non-exclusive contracts, the upstream supplier selects
also whether to make each of these contracts contingent or non-contingent. In addition, it
decides whether or not to offer the same type of contract to both downstream firms. In
case that the two contracts differ, the upstream supplier decides whether to offer, e.g., the
contingent contract to the low or the high quality downstream firm. At the second stage,
the upstream monopolist and the downstream firm(s) bargain (simultaneously) over two-part
tariff contract(s). Finally, the downstream firm(s) set price(s) in the market.11
As is standard, we use subgame perfection to solve our three-stage game. Moreover, we
invoke the Nash equilibrium of simultaneous generalized Nash bargaining problems to solve
for the simultaneous contract terms negotiations between U and each of Di, i = h, l, under
non-exclusive contracts. Under exclusive contracts, the generalized Nash bargaining solution
is also used to solve for the contract terms negotiations between U and one of the downstream
firms.
3 Contract terms and market outcomes
In the next subsections, we analyze the subgames in which the upstream monopolist offers
respectively an exclusive contract or two non-exclusive contracts. In the latter case, we
distinguish between the symmetric cases in which both downstream firms are offered either
non-contingent or contingent contracts and the mixed cases of one downstream firm being
offered a contingent and the other a non-contingent contract.
3.1 Exclusive contract
Under an exclusive contract, the downstream firm to which the upstream supplier offers the
contract becomes a monopolist in the final good market. Let Tm ≡ (wm, tm) be the two-
part tariff contract signed by the upstream and the downstream firm, where wm is the input
price and tm is the fixed fee, with m standing for downstream monopoly. The profits of the
11Section 6 deals with the alternative case in which firms compete in quantities.
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upstream and downstream firms are, respectively
Πm(pm, Tm) = Dm(pm)wm + tm, pim(pm, Tm) = Dm(pm)(pm − wm)− tm. (6)
In the last stage, the downstream firm maximizes its profit by setting pˆm(wm) =
ui+wm
2 .
Substituting the latter into (6), we obtain downstream and upstream equilibrium profits
Πˆm(Tm) =
(ui−wm)wm
2ui
+ tm (7)
and
pˆim(Tm) =
(ui−wm)2
4ui
− tm. (8)
Turning to the second stage, the upstream supplier and the downstream firm negotiate over
the contract terms. As the upstream supplier is committed to offer an exclusive contract, in
case of failure to reach an agreement neither the upstream nor the downstream firm operate
in the market; hence both firms’ outside options are nil. The generalized Nash product is,
therefore,
NPm(Tm) = Πˆm(Tm)
µpˆim(Tm)
1−µ. (9)
The maximization of (9) with respect to wm and tm yields w
∗
m = 0 and t
∗
m =
ui
4 µ. As standard
in this case, the two-part tariff contract is set in such a way as to maximize the joint profit of
the vertical chain. This is achieved by setting the input price equal to the upstream marginal
cost and by apportioning the maximum joint profit between the upstream and downstream
firm via the fixed fee, according to their respective bargaining powers. Therefore, the profits
accruing to the upstream firm are ui4 µ and are increasing in the quality of the good ui. As
a consequence, the upstream supplier will offer the exclusive contract to the high quality
downstream firm. The following Lemma summarizes our findings.
Lemma 1. If the upstream supplier opts for an exclusive contract, it offers it to the high
quality downstream firm. The equilibrium contract terms are w∗m = 0 and t∗m =
uh
4 µ. The
equilibrium price is p∗m =
uh
2 ,the equilibrium demand is D
∗
m =
1
2 , and the equilibrium profits
of the upstream and downstream firms are, respectively, Π∗m =
uh
4 µ and pi
∗
m =
uh
4 (1 − µ).
Moreover, the consumer surplus is CS∗m =
uh
8 .
3.2 Non-exclusive non-contingent contracts
We now turn to the case in which the upstream monopolist offers supply contracts to both
downstream firms. For the sake of brevity, we will often refer to the contract signed between
the upstream supplier and the high (low) quality downstream firm as “the high (low) quality
contract”.We assume that negotiations over contract terms within each (U ,Di) pair occur
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simultaneously and separately, and that the contracts are interim observable, i.e., once the
contracts have been signed, their terms become known to all the parties (see e.g., McAfee
and Schwartz, 1995). It is well-known that in such a situation, the vertical relations between
the upstream supplier and each of the downstream firms are affected by opportunism. In
particular, within each (U ,Di) negotiating pair, an incentive exists to secretly renegotiate the
contract terms at their own advantage and at the expense of the rival downstream firm j
(i, j = h, l, i 6= j). One of the consequences is that multiple equilibria may arise in this case.
To deal with this issue and obtain a unique outcome, we invoke pairwise proofness in the
equilibrium contracts (O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992; Milliou and Petrakis, 2007; Alipranti et al.,
2014).
In this subsection, we consider that the upstream supplier offers non-contingent contracts
to both downstream firms, while the case of contingent and mixed contracts will be analyzed
in the following two subsections. A contract between U and Di is non-contingent if its terms
remain intact independently whether the (U ,Dj) negotiating pair reaches or not an agreement.
Stated differently, the (out-of-equilibrium) occurrence of breakdown in the negotiations be-
tween the upstream supplier and the downstream firm j does not initiate negotiations anew
between U and Di, instead the (U ,Di) pair abides with its agreed contract terms. By contrast,
a contract is contingent when it specifies different contract terms for the case of agreement
and for the case of disagreement in the rival bargaining pair. For a thorough discussion of
contract contingency see Milliou and Petrakis (2007).
In the last stage, given the demand system in (4) and the contracts Ti ≡ (wi, ti) signed be-
tween the upstream supplier and the downstream firm i, i = h, l, the profits of the downstream
firm i and the upstream supplier are
pii(ph, pl, Ti) = Di(ph, pl)(pi − wi)− ti, i = h, l, (10)
Π(ph, pl, Th, Tl) = Dh(ph, pl)wh +Dl(ph, pl)wl + th + tl. (11)
Solving the system of equations defined by the first-order conditions ∂pii(·)∂pi = 0 and ob-
serving that the second-order conditions are satisfied as long as uh > ul > 0, it is easy to
obtain the equilibrium prices
pˆh(wh, wl) =
uh[2(uh − ul + wh) + wl]
4uh − ul , pˆl(wh, wl) =
ul(uh − ul + wh) + 2uhwl
4uh − ul . (12)
Substituting (12) into (10) and (11), the equilibrium downstream and upstream profits
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are
pˆih(Th, wl) =
[
2u2h + uh(wl − 2(ul + wh)) + ulwh
]2
(uh − ul)(4uh − ul)2 − th, (13)
pˆil(Tl, wh) =
uh [uh(ul − 2wl) + ul(wh + wl − ul)]2
ul(uh − ul)(4uh − ul)2 − tl, (14)
Πˆ(Th, Tl) =
ulϑ+ uhulwl(uh − ul + 2wh) + uhw2l (ul − 2uh)
ul(uh − ul)(4uh − ul) + th + tl, (15)
with ϑ =
[
w2h(ul − 2uh) + 2uhwh(uh − ul)
]
.
We next turn to the bargaining stage. As noted above, in the case of non-contingent
contracts, say, the (U ,Dh) pair cannot include in their bargaining agenda contract terms that
will be executed only in the (out-of-equilibrium) case of negotiations breakdown between U
and Dl.This entails that the outside option for the upstream monopolist when bargaining with
downstream firm i depends on the equilibrium contract terms signed with firm j.
Let TNi ≡ (wNi , tNi ), i = h, l, be the equilibrium non-contingent contract signed within
the (U ,Di) pair. In the bargaining with, say, firm Dh, the outside option of the upstream
monopolist is the profit it would earn in case of negotiations breakdown with firm Dh itself.
Should this occur, the upstream supplier still expects to sign the contract TNl with down-
stream firm Dl, which, however, will be a monopolist in the final good market. The outside
option for the upstream monopolist is, therefore, Πˆm(T
N
l ), whereas the outside option for the
downstream firm Dh is zero (Similarly, for the bargaining between U and Dl).12 Accordingly,
the generalized Nash products are
NPNh (Th, T
N
l ) =
[
Πˆ(Th, T
N
l )− Πˆm(TNl )
]µ
pˆih(Th, w
N
l )
1−µ, (16)
NPNl (T
N
h , Tl) =
[
Πˆ(TNh , Tl)− Πˆm(TNh )
]µ
pˆil(Tl, w
N
h )
1−µ. (17)
12Inderst and Wey (2003); de Fontenay and Gans (2005) develop an explicit strategic bargaining game to
model the idea that the negotiation between parties can come to a breakdown.
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Standard maximization techniques allow us to find the equilibrium non-contingent contracts13
TNh = (w
N
h , t
N
h ) =
(
ul
4
,
8µu3h − 4(1 + µ)u2hul + 2(1− µ)uhu2l − (1− µ)u3l
32u2h
)
, (18)
TNl = (w
N
l , t
N
l ) =
(
u2l
4uh
,
ul[2µuh − (3− µ)ul]
32uh
)
. (19)
Substituting the above back into prices, demands and profits yields the following result.
Lemma 2. If the upstream supplier offers non-contingent contracts to both downstream firms
then the equilibrium contract terms are (18) and (19). The equilibrium prices are pNh =
2uh−ul
4
and pNl =
ul
4 , and the equilibrium demands D
N
h =
1
2 and D
N
l =
1
4 . The equilibrium profit of
the upstream monopolist is ΠN =
8µu3h−2µu2hul+(1−µ)uhu2l−(1−µ)u3l
32u2h
, and those of the downstream
firms are piNh =
(1−µ)(2uh−ul)2(2uh+ul)
32u2h
and piNl =
(1−µ)ul(2uh+ul)
32uh
. Finally, the consumer surplus
is CSN = uh8 +
5
32ul.
3.3 Non-exclusive contingent contracts
Contingent contracts capture the idea that bargaining pairs can come to a permanent and
irrevocable breakdown in their negotiations (see, e.g. Inderst and Wey, 2003; de Fontenay
and Gans, 2005). Therefore, a contingent contact between the upstream monopolist and the
downstream firm i contains specific terms that will be executed in case that the negotiations
between U and Dj breakdown. In such a case, the downstream firm i becomes a monopolist
in the final good market and the upstream supplier’s profit is as under exclusive contracts,
namely, ui4 µ (see subsection 3.1). The latter is thus the outside option of the upstream supplier
in the bargaining with the downstream firm i, while the outside option of the downstream
firm is again nil.
As the last stage of the game is unaffected by the contingency or not of the contracts (see
subsection 3.2 for last stage equilibrium outcomes), the generalized Nash products are
NPCh (Th, T
C
l ) =
[
Πˆ(Th, T
C
l )−
ul
4
µ
]µ
pˆih(Th, w
C
l )
1−µ, (20)
NPCl (T
C
h , Tl) =
[
Πˆ(TCh , Tl)−
uh
4
µ
]µ
pˆil(Tl, w
C
h )
1−µ. (21)
where TCi ≡ (wCi , tCi ), i = h, l, is the equilibrium contingent contract signed between U and
Di.
13Maximizing first each generalized Nash product NPNi (·) w.r.t. ti, then plugging the solution back into
NPNi (·), we end up with an expression proportional to the excess joint profits of the (U ,Di) pair. Then
maximizing these excess joint profits w.r.t. wi and solving the system of the first order conditions, we obtain the
equilibrium contract terms. Second-order conditions are locally satisfied, which, together with the uniqueness
of the maximizers, insures the uniqueness of the solution. The detailed (and cumbersome) calculations are
available upon request.
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Unlike in the case of non-contingent contracts, concavity of the functions (20) and (21)
at the critical points identified by the first order conditions (focs) is not always guaranteed.
Nevertheless, a sufficient condition that guarantees concavity at the unique solution of the
system of the focs is that µ ≤ 34 . In fact, if 34 < µ ≤ 1, the profit of the low quality downstream
firm at the solution of the focs turns out to be negative, thereby violating its participation
constraint. Here we will focus on the analysis of the interior solution, relegating that of the
corner solution (34 < µ ≤ 1) to the Appendix 1. As we will see, offering two contingent
contracts in this latter case turns out to be a dominated strategy for the upstream supplier.
Let µ ≤ 34 . Using standard maximization techniques,14 we obtain the equilibrium contracts
TCh = (w
C
h , t
C
h ) =
(
ul
4
,
4µ(2− µ)uh − (3 + µ)ul)
16(2− µ)
)
, (22)
TCl = (w
C
l , t
C
l ) =
(
u2l
4uh
,
ul[(−1 + 6µ− 4µ2)uh − (2− µ)ul]
16(2− µ)uh
)
. (23)
The following Lemma summarizes our findings.
Lemma 3. If the upstream supplier offers contingent contracts to both downstream firms then:
(i) If µ ≤ 34 , the equilibrium contract terms are given by (22) and (23). The equilibrium
prices are pCh =
2uh−ul
4 , p
C
l =
ul
4 , and the equilibrium demands are D
C
h =
1
2 , D
C
l =
1
4 .
The equilibrium profits of the upstream monopolist are ΠC = µ[4uh−ul+4(1−µ)(uh+ul)]16(2−µ) and
those of the downstream firms are piCh =
(1−µ)[4uh(2−µ)−5ul]
16(2−µ) and pi
C
l =
ul(1−µ)(3−4µ)
16(2−µ) . The
consumer surplus is CSC = uh8 +
5
32ul.
(ii) If 34 < µ ≤ 1, the upstream supplier should adjust the fixed fee downwards in order to
incentivize the low-quality firm to sign the contract. Non exclusive contingent contracts
are, however, dominated by an exclusive contract offered to the high-quality downstream
firm.
3.4 Non-exclusive mixed contracts
In this subsection we consider the case in which the upstream supplier offers a non-contingent
contract to one downstream firm and a contingent contract to the other one. In what follows,
we focus on the analysis of the case in which the contingent contract is offered to the low-
quality downstream firm and the non-contingent contract to the high-quality one. As is shown
in the Appendix 2, the reverse case is always dominated by the upstream supplier offering
contingent contracts to both downstream firms.
14see footnote 13.
14
When Dl is offered a contingent contract, Dh knows that in case of a breakdown in its
negotiations with the upstream supplier, U and Dl will behave as a chain of monopolies.
Therefore, the outside option for the upstream supplier in the negotiations with the high
quality downstream firm is µul4 . Conversely, the outside option for U in the negotiations with
Dl stems from the fact that its contract with Dh cannot include clauses that are contingent
on the disagreement between U and Dl itself. Letting TMi ≡ (wMi , tMi ) be the equilibrium
contract signed between U and Di, i = h, l, the generalized Nash products are
NPMh (Th, T
M
l ) =
[
Πˆ(Th, T
M
l )−
ul
4
µ
]µ
pˆih(Th, w
M
l )
1−µ, (24)
NPMl (T
M
h , Tl) =
[
Πˆ(TMh , Tl)− Πˆm(TMh )
]µ
pˆil(Tl, w
M
h )
1−µ. (25)
As in the case of contingent contracts, the generalized Nash products (24) and (25) are not
always concave at the solution of the system of the first-order conditions. In particular,
the concavity of NPMh (·) is guaranteed either when uluh ≤ 45 or when
ul
uh
> 45 and µ ≤
8u2h−4uhul−u2l
ul(6uh−ul) < 1.
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In this parameter constellation, standard maximization techniques16 lead to the equilib-
rium contracts
TMh = (w
M
h , t
M
h ) =
(
ul
4
,
8µu2h − 2
(
3µ2 − µ+ 2)uhul + (1− µ)2u2l
32uh
)
, (26)
TMl = (w
M
l , t
M
l ) =
(
u2l
4uh
,
ul[2µuh − (3− µ)ul]
32uh
)
. (27)
Note that the fixed fee offered to the low-quality downstream firm tMl is equal to the
respective one under non-contingent contracts tNl .This is because t
M
l does not depend on the
fixed fee offered to the high-quality firm. Yet, the latter differs from the fixed fee offered to
the high-quality firm under non-contingent contracts.
The following Lemma summarizes our findings.
Lemma 4. If the upstream supplier offers a contingent contract to the low-quality downstream
firm and a non-contingent contract to the high-quality one then:
(i) If uluh ≤ 45 , or
ul
uh
> 45 and µ ≤
8u2h−4uhul−u2l
ul(6uh−ul) < 1, the equilibrium contract terms are
given by (26) and (27). The equilibrium prices are pMh =
2uh−ul
4 , p
M
l =
ul
4 , and the
15When these conditions fail to hold, then in the interior solution the high-quality downstream firm makes
negative profits and thus, its participation constraint is violated. To keep the high-quality downstream firm
in the market, the upstream should adjust the fixed fee downwards. However, as it is shown in Appendix 3,
the latter strategy is dominated by the upstream supplier offering an exclusive contract to the high-quality
downstream firm.
16see footnote 13.
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equilibrium demands are DMh =
1
2 , D
M
l =
1
4 . The equilibrium profits of the upstream
supplier are ΠM =
µ(8u2h+(4−6µ)uhul+(µ−1)u2l )
32uh
, and those of the downstream firms are
piMh =
(1−µ)[8u2h−µul(6uh−ul)−(4uh+ul)u`]
32uh
and piMl =
(1−µ)ul(2uh+ul)
32uh
. The consumer surplus
is CSC = uh8 +
5
32ul.
(ii) If uluh >
4
5 and
8u2h−4uhul−u2l
ul(6uh−ul) < µ < 1, the upstream supplier must adjust the fixed fee
downwards in order to incentivize the high-quality firm to sign the contract. These non-
exclusive mixed contracts are, however, dominated by an exclusive contract offered to
the high-quality downstream firm.
Proof. See Appendix 3 for the part ii).
4 Contract selection
We are now in a position to determine the optimal contract choice for the upstream supplier.
Let r ≡ uluh , with r ∈ (0, 1). The following Proposition states our main result.
Proposition 1. Let µ1(r) ≡ r(1−r)6−r and µ2(r) ≡ 2(1−r)6−r , with 0 < µ1(r) < µ2(r) <
3
4
. The
upstream supplier offers:
(i) two non-exclusive, non-contingent contracts for µ ∈ [0, µ1(r)],
(ii) a non-exclusive, non-contingent contract to downstream firm Dh and a non-exclusive,
contingent contract to downstream firm Dl for µ ∈ [µ1(r), µ2(r)],
(iii) two non-exclusive, contingent contracts for µ ∈ [µ2(r), 34 ],
(iv) an exclusive contract to downstream firm Dh for µ ∈ [34 , 1].
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Figure 1 depicts in the (r, µ)-space the equilibrium contract selection. Two main mech-
anisms govern the choice of the upstream supplier over the type of contract(s) to be offered
to the downstream firms. The first mechanism concerns the choice between an exclusive con-
tract and two non-exclusive contracts. The second one applies to the choice within the class
of non-exclusive contracts and refers to the specific type of contract to be offered to each of
the downstream firms.
As far as the first trade-off is concerned, the forces at stake are as follows. On the
one hand, an exclusive contract allows U to create a monopoly in the downstream market.
As a consequence, aggregate industry profits are maximized and are equal to those of a
16
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Figure 1: Equilibrium contract partition under price competition.
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vertically integrated monopolist (Remember that the equilibrium contract is such that the
input price is zero, avoiding thus double-marginalization). These profits are then apportioned
between U and Dh according to their respective bargaining powers. Yet, because of contract
exclusivity, the upstream supplier has no outside option in the bargaining withDh, which tends
to reduce its equilibrium profits. On the other hand, by selecting non-exclusive contracts,
U enjoys an outside option in its negotiations with each of the downstream firms, which
improves its bargaining position for all values of µ. Yet, this comes at the cost of generating a
profit-dissipating competition in the downstream market (which is only partially ameliorated
by above marginal cost input pricing). The latter coupled with the well-known upstream
monopolist’s commitment problem, generated by the simultaneous and separate negotiations
with the two downstream firms, tends to reduce its equilibrium profits. As a consequence, the
upstream supplier prefers to avoid creating competition in the downstream market as long as
it has high bargaining power (µ > 34) and can, therefore, appropriate most of the maximized
aggregate industry profits. By contrast, when its bargaining power is lower (µ ≤ 34), U
prefers entering into non-exclusive relations that generate favorable outside options at the
negotiation stage. By doing so, it strengthens its bargaining position and compensates for the
lower bargaining power. At the expense, however, of a reduction in the aggregate industry
profits, part of which it could appropriate.
Regarding the choice of the specific type of contract(s) within the set of non-exclusive
contracts, the following observations are in order. First, when U selects a contract type
(contingent vs. non-contingent) to offer to Di, it actually determines its outside option in
the negotiation with Dj . With this in mind, observe that under a contingent contract with
Di, the outside option of U in its negotiations with Dj is its share of the vertically integrated
monopoly profit (remember that the input price is zero in this case). Under non-contingent
contracts, by contrast, the input prices are above zero, due to the commitment problem. As
input prices do not depend on the upstream bargaining power, they remain positive even when
µ is close to zero. Therefore, as µ becomes very small, the outside option of the upstream
supplier goes to zero under contingent contracts, whereas it remains positive under non-
contingent contracts (due to the input price still being positive). This entails that the outside
options of the upstream supplier become larger under non-contingent than under contingent
contracts for µ small enough. In particular, in the bargaining with downstream firm Dh,
this occurs when µ < µ1(r), and in the bargaining with Dl, when µ < µ2(r). Therefore,
the upstream supplier’s bargaining position is affected by the type of contract(s) it selects.
Hence, starting from a high value of the bargaining power (µ ∈ [µ2(r), 34 ]), the most favorable
outside options for the upstream supplier are guaranteed by two contingent contracts. As µ
decreases (µ ∈ [µ1(r), µ2(r)]), the outside option in the negotiation with Dl becomes larger
with a non-contingent than with a contingent contract signed with Dh. Lastly, when µ is
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small (µ ∈ [0, µ1(r)]), also the outside option in the negotiation with Dh becomes larger under
a non-contingent contract. The latter sheds light on why the upstream supplier never finds it
optimal to offer a contingent contract to Dh and a non-contingent contract to Dl.
5 Discussion of equilibrium outcomes
We should stress again that equilibrium input prices do not depend on the contingency or not
of the non-exclusive contracts. This is not surprising, because the variable part of the two-
tariff contract wi maximizes the excess joint profits of the (U ,Di) negotiating pair, whereas
the fixed part ti apportions the maximized excess joint profits to each of the involved parties
according to their respective bargaining powers. As a result, input prices are independent
of the distribution of the bargaining power. Note however that equilibrium input prices are
higher than the upstream marginal cost because of the upstream monopolist’s endeavor to
relax downstream price competition. Yet, the upstream monopolist is unable to publicly
commit to contracts and due to this commitment problem (O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992), the
equilibrium contract terms fail to maximize the aggregate industry profits.
As equilibrium input prices coincide under all types of non-exclusive contracts, the final
goods prices are the same as well. This, in turn, entails that equilibrium demands and
consumer surplus are the same too (compare Lemmata 2, 3 and 4). By contrast, the profits
accruing to the upstream supplier and the downstream firms differ, because the equilibrium
fixed fees are different under contingent, non-contingent and mixed contracts, reflecting the
differences in the upstream monopolist’s outside options.
Interestingly, the fixed fees may be positive or negative depending on the distribution of the
bargaining power, as reported in the following Lemma. Letting Ril ≡ wilDil + til, i ∈ {C,M,N}
be the upstream supplier’s profits from selling input to the low-quality firm, we obtain the
following results.
Lemma 5. (i) If the optimal contracts are non-contingent (i.e., µ ∈ [0, µ1(r)]), then the
fixed fees, tNh and t
N
l , are both negative; moreover, R
N
l < 0.
(ii) If the optimal contracts are mixed (i.e., µ ∈ [µ1(r), µ2(r)]), then:
∀r > 0.448 ⇒ tMh < 0, otherwise tMh R 0⇔ µ R
4 + r − r2 −√16 + 8r − 31r2 + 8r3
(6r − r2) ≡ µ
M
h (r)
∀r > 0.202 ⇒ tMl < 0, otherwise tMl R 0⇔ µ R
3r
2 + r
≡ µMl (r)
∀r > 0.472 ⇒ RMl < 0, otherwise RMl R 0⇔ µ R
r
2 + r
≡ µMR (r)
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(iii) If the optimal contracts are contingent (i.e., µ ∈ [µ2(r), 3/4]), then:
tCh R 0 ⇔ µ R
8− r −√64− 64r + r2
8
≡ µCh (r)
tCl R 0 ⇔ µ R
6 + r −√20− 20r + r2
8
≡ µCl (r)
RCl R 0 ⇔ µ R
3−√5
4
≡ µCR(r)
Figure 2 depicts the various regions described in Lemma 5. In the purple-shaded areas
the respective variables take positive values, whereas in the yellow-shaded areas they take
negative values.
Under all types of non-exclusive contracts, if the bargaining power of the upstream sup-
plier is large (µ high), the share of the excess joint profits of each negotiating pair accruing,
via the fixed fee, to the upstream supplier is large. As µ decreases, the fixed fees shrink.
Ultimately, when µ becomes sufficiently small, the fixed fees become negative: The upstream
monopolist partially subsidizes, through the fixed fees, the downstream firms, yet it receives
positive payments via sales at input prices above its marginal cost. Surprisingly, the non-
exclusive contract offered to the low-quality downstream firm can, in fact, generate losses
for the upstream supplier, i.e., the positive revenues from input sales can be lower than the
negative fixed fee (see yellow region in Figure 2c).17 In this case, the upstream supplier op-
timally suffers such a loss in order to gain a stronger outside option in the negotiations with
the high-quality downstream firm that sells the “high value-added” product. The above are
particularly relevant under non-contingent contracts in which case both fixed fees tNh and t
N
l
are always negative and at the same time, the revenue collected by input sales to Dl does not
cover the negative fixed fee - transfer downstream (i.e., RNl < 0).
The following Proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 2. Under non-contingent, non-exclusive equilibrium contracts, the fixed fees
always act as subsidies to the downstream firms, and moreover, the contract offered to the low-
quality downstream firm generates a loss for the upstream supplier. These observations hold
also under contingent and mixed, non-exclusive equilibrium contracts as long as the bargaining
power of the upstream supplier is sufficiently low.
Note that the parameter space in which fixed fees are negative grows larger as the products
become less differentiated (as r increases). Intuitively, the less differentiated the products,
the smaller the industry producer surplus to be shared among the upstream supplier and
the downstream firms. As downstream firms pay positive input prices, but should still earn
17Note that for any µ we have Rih = w
i
hD
i
h + t
i
h > 0, i.e., the contract offered to the high-quality firm
generates always gains for the upstream supplier.
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Figure 2: Optimal tariffs and total profit from Dl under Contingent and Mixed equilibrium
contracts.
overall non-negative profits, a higher part of the industry producer surplus accrues to them
as the goods become less differentiated.
6 Extensions
6.1 Quantity competition
In this Section, we explore the optimal choice of contracts by the upstream supplier under
the alternative assumption of downstream quantity competition. It is well-known that com-
petition in quantities softens the competitive pressure on firms in one-tier industries (see e.g.
Singh and Vives, 1984), but this result is not robust when considering multi-layer industries
(Alipranti et al., 2014). As most of the analysis parallels that of downstream price competi-
tion, we report hereafter only our main findings.18 Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium contract
configurations in the (r, µ) space of parameters.
The main message drawn from Figure 3 is that, under downstream quantity competition,
the equilibrium contract selection conveys important similarities to the case of price competi-
tion considered above. In particular, when U has relatively high bargaining power, it selects
to enter into an exclusive relationship with Dh. For intermediate values of the bargaining
power, U offers two non-exclusive, contingent contracts. Whereas for lower values of µ, U
offers a contingent contract to Dl and a non-contingent one to Dh. These contract offers are
qualitatively similar to the case of downstream price competition. Yet, in contrast to price
competition, U never offers non-contingent contracts to both downstream firms.
18Needless to say, the detailed analysis, which follows exactly the same steps as under downstream price
competition, is available upon request.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium contract partition under quantity competition.
A few observations are worth making here, that will help in pinpointing the similarities
and divergences relative to the downstream price competition case. First, under exclusive
contracts there is no competition downstream and the equilibrium outcome is as in Section
3.1. Second, equilibrium input prices again coincide under different non-exclusive contract
configurations, yet they are now below upstream marginal cost due to the commitment prob-
lem (see, e.g. Alipranti et al., 2014). The latter tends to reduce, relative to the downstream
price competition case, the profits accruing to the upstream supplier.
An immediate consequence is that non-contingent contracts offered to both downstream
firms are never optimal for the upstream supplier. In fact, when µ is low, the fixed fees
ti, i = h, l are small. In addition, the upstream supplier’s outside options under non-contingent
contracts are negative. As a consequence, U ’s profits are small and eventually become negative
for low enough µ (and are thus significantly lower than in the case of downstream price
competition). By contrast, a contingent contract offered to Dl, along with a non-contingent
one offered to Dh, makes the outside option of U in its bargaining with Dl positive and as a
consequence, the mixed contract configuration dominates non-contingent contacts offered to
both downstream firms.
The intuition regarding the upstream supplier’s choice between an exclusive contract of-
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fered to Dh and non-exclusive, contingent contracts offered to both downstream firms is
qualitatively similar to that under downstream price competition. This is also the case for
the upstream supplier’s choice between the latter contracts and the mixed contracts.
The comparison of the regions in which mixed contracts are selected - the green areas in
Figures 1 and 3 - leads to a last remark. Contrary to the case of downstream price com-
petition, mixed contracts under quantity competition are never optimal when the degree of
vertical product differentiation is low (large r).19 In the latter case downstream competition
is fierce and as a consequence, the total producer surplus generated in the industry is small,
entailing that U ’s outside options are small too. This implies that under mixed contracts, as
the products become more homogeneous, the outside option of U in the negotiation with Dl
becomes small (and eventually negative) even for relatively large values of µ. By contrast,
under contingent contracts, the upstream supplier’s outside options, albeit lower under down-
stream quantity competition, are non-negative even when the degree of product differentiation
is small. As a consequence, U opts to offer contingent contracts to both downstream firms in
this case.
6.2 Alternative utility specification
One natural question that may arise is to which extent our results rely on the assump-
tion of vertically differentiated products with Mussa and Rosen (1978) utility function (MU,
henceforth). In this section, we demonstrate that qualitatively similar results hold when
the products are horizontally differentiated and the utility function is as specified in Bowley
(1924), Spence (1976) and Dixit (1979) (BSD, henceforth). In particular, the utility of the
representative consumer is
U(D1, D2) = αD1 + αD2 − 1
2
(
D21 +D
2
2 + 2γD1D2
)
+m, (28)
where Di is the quantity of good i, i ∈ {1, 2} that the consumer purchases and m is the
respective quantity of the “composite” good. The consumer’s optimal behavior gives rise to
the following linear demand system
D1(p1, p2) =
α(1− γ)− p1 + γp2
1− γ2 , D2(p1, p2) =
α(1− γ)− p2 + γp1
1− γ2 , (29)
where p1 and p2 are the prices of goods 1 and 2 respectively, α > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1) indicates the
degree of product substitutability. When γ is close to zero, the goods are almost independent,
whereas when γ tends to one, the goods become almost homogenous. The most remarkable
19Indeed, in order mixed contracts to be optimal, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition is that r < 0.382,
see figure 3.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium contract configurations with BSD utility.
differences between the present model and our main model are that under the utility function
in (28) (i) the goods are symmetric from the point of view of the consumer and (ii) the
consumer is not restricted to purchase discrete quantities of the goods.
The analysis here closely follows the steps presented in the previous sections. To save
on space, we will present the main findings under the BSD utility specification diagrammat-
ically.20 Figure 4, panel (4a) and panel (4b), depict the equilibrium contract configurations
under downstream price and quantity competition, respectively.
As can easily be seen from Figure 4, our findings under the BSD utility specification convey
important similarities with those under the MR utility specification. The most remarkable
difference is that the upstream supplier never finds it optimal to offer mixed contracts. In
contrast to the MR utility specification, as the consumer’s preferences are symmetric over the
two goods in this case, the upstream supplier is indifferent between offering the contingent
contract to downstream firm 1 (D1) and the non-contingent to downstream firm 2 (D2) or
vice versa. Mixed contracts are then dominated either by contingent or by non-contingent
contracts offered to both downstream firms. In particular, under quantity competition, mixed
contracts are always dominated by two contingent contracts, whereas under price competition
they are dominated by two contingent (non-contingent) contracts as long as µ is high (low).21
20The detailed analysis is available upon request.
21The critical value is µ(γ) ≡ 2γ2(2−γ−γ2)
8+γ(1+γ)(2−γ2) which separates the regions of contingent and non-contingent
contracts in Figure 4 panel (4a).
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Clearly, under quantity competition, a non-contingent contract signed with Di leads to an
outside option for the upstream supplier in its bargaining with Dj smaller than when it signs
a contingent contract with Di. As a result, two contingent contracts always dominate a mixed
contract. Under price competition, for low µ, U ’s outside option in the bargaining with Dj
under a contingent contract signed with Di is smaller than when it signs a non-contingent
contract with Di. As a result, two non-contingent contracts dominate mixed contracts for
low values of µ. The reverse reasoning holds for high µ and thus, two contingent contracts
dominate mixed contracts.
Another difference lies in the characteristics of the parameter region in which an exclusive
contract is chosen by the upstream supplier. In fact, in the MR utility specification case,
under both price and quantity downstream competition, an exclusive contract is offered to
Dh for any degree of vertical product differentiation (provided that µ is large enough). This
is not so with the BSD utility specification, in which case an exclusive contract is offered
only if goods are close enough substitutes (γ high enough). This can be seen by comparing
Figures (1) and (3), with (4). This is due to the different nature of the two models. Under the
MR utility specification, the goods are vertically differentiated, with all consumers a priori
preferring the high-quality over the low-quality good. The coexistence of high- and low-
quality variants has a profit erosion effect that is particularly detrimental on the upstream
supplier’s revenues from the sales of the high-quality good, i.e., the good that allows for a
higher extraction of consumer surplus. As a consequence, when the upstream supplier can
extract most of the surplus from the downstream market (µ is high), it prefers to avoid
profit-dissipating downstream competition and opts thus for an exclusive contract with the
high-quality downstream firm. Under the BSD utility specification, goods are symmetrically
horizontally differentiated, with the representative consumer having a priori no preference
for one or the other good. As a consequence, when the degree of product substitutability
is low (γ is low), the loss in industry producer surplus due to downstream competition is
small. This entails that the upstream supplier prefers to strengthen its bargaining position by
offering non-exclusive, contingent contracts to both downstream firms even if it can extract
most of the industry producer surplus (µ high). By contrast, an exclusive contract becomes
rentable only if the degree of product substitutability is high. When γ is high, downstream
competition has a strong negative effect on industry producer surplus. Then the upstream
supplier prefers to avoid profit-eroding downstream competition, opting thus for an exclusive
contract.
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7 Conclusion
We have investigated the optimal contract choice of an upstream monopolist that may sell an
essential input to two downstream firms that produce vertically differentiated products and
compete in prices or in quantities in the final goods market. In the outset of the game, the
upstream supplier can offer an exclusive contract to one of the downstream firms, or non-
exclusive contracts to both of them, in which case each of the contracts could be contingent
or non-contingent. Contract terms negotiations, and in particular over two-part tariffs, are
then conducted between the upstream supplier and the downstream firm(s). A non-contingent
contract does not allow renegotiation of contract terms with a downstream firm in case that
the upstream supplier does not reach an agreement with the rival downstream firm. A con-
tingent contract instead allows for different contract terms in case of agreement and in case
of disagreement in the negotiations between the upstream supplier and the rival downstream
firm.
We show that the distribution of the bargaining power and the degree of vertical product
differentiation play a crucial role in determining the equilibrium outcome. In particular, when
the bargaining power of the upstream supplier is relatively high, it prefers to sign an exclusive
contract with the high-quality downstream firm. In this way, it avoids downstream compe-
tition that erodes aggregate industry profits and moreover, it extracts most of the producer
surplus generated by the ensuing vertically integrated market structure. For lower values of
bargaining power, the upstream supplier opts for non-exclusive contracts. In this way, the
upstream supplier generates outside options in its negotiations with the downstream firms,
at the cost however of increasing downstream competition. By strengthening its bargaining
position, it obtains a larger share of an otherwise smaller industry producer surplus and in-
creases thus its profits. Further, we show that for intermediate bargaining power values, the
upstream supplier prefers to offer contingent contracts to both downstream firms; whereas for
lower values, it opts for mixed contracts, i.e., a contingent contract to the low-quality down-
stream firm and a non-contingent to the high-quality one. Finally, the upstream supplier offers
non-contingent contracts to both downstream firms only if the upstream bargaining power
is quite low and downstream firms compete in prices. This never occurs under downstream
quantity competition because the upstream monopolist suffers from a strong commitment
problem that results to negative input prices.
Finally, we have shown that our main findings are qualitatively similar when we consider
symmetrically horizontally differentiated markets. In those markets, if we replace the degree
of vertical product differentiation with the degree of product substitutability, we obtain a
similar partition of the parameter space regarding the upstream supplier’s contract choices.
Our analysis leads to a number of testable implications. In markets with a powerful
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upstream supplier, we should observe foreclosure in the downstream market. In particular,
low-quality downstream firms are expected to be foreclosed by the upstream monopolist. By
contrast, when the upstream supplier is not so powerful, we should observe non-exclusive
contracts offered to downstream firms. In addition, the “complexity” of non-exclusive con-
tracts is expected to be positively related to the bargaining power of the upstream supplier:
More powerful suppliers should sign contracts including clauses that allow for renegotiation in
case of an increase in downstream concentration, whereas in contracts signed by less powerful
upstream suppliers, such clauses are expected to be absent. Furthermore, mixed contracts
should mainly be observed in markets where goods dispose some vertical product differenti-
ation characteristics, whereas they should be much less common in markets for horizontally
differentiated goods. Finally, in markets with quantity competition, exclusive contracts should
be observed more frequently than in markets characterized by price competition.
Our analysis suggests several lines for future research. First, one direction is to consider
that the two downstream firms have different bargaining powers relative to the upstream
supplier. We expect that our intuitive arguments concerning the choice between exclusive
and non-exclusive contracts would apply in this case too. However, due to the asymmetry
in bargaining powers, mixed contracts with a contingent contract offered to high-quality firm
and a non-contingent to the low-quality firm could emerge. Another direction is to let the
number of competing downstream firms increase. The configuration of contracts to be offered
by the upstream supplier is expected to be richer now, but the upstream bargaining power
will still play a significant role in its choice of specific contracts. One should expect that the
higher the upstream bargaining power, the more concentrated the downstream market will
be.
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Appendix
1 Contingent contracts: the case 34 < µ ≤ 1
Assume that 34 < µ ≤ 1. In this parameter region the low-quality downstream firm cannot
enjoy non-negative profits in the interior solution, nonetheless, to sign the contract, it must
not incur losses as well. As a consequence, the equilibrium contract must be such that the
low quality downstream firm reaps zero profits. Nevertheless, the low quality contract must
still maximize the excess joint profits of the (U ,Dl) pair which, by virtue of the foregoing
observation, completely accrue to the upstream supplier. In fact, the fixed fee charged by
U to Dl is adjusted downwards such that the downstream firm is indifferent between signing
or not the contract. Thus, the equilibrium contracts are obtained by solving the following
problem
max
wh,th
NPCh (Th, T
C
l ), maxwl
[Πˆ(TCh , Tl) + pˆil(Tl, w
C
h )], and pˆil(Tl, w
C
h )
tl= 0. (30)
The equilibrium contracts are then
TCh = (w
C
h , t
C
h ) =
(
ul
4
,
4uhµ+ ul(−3 + (3− 4µ)µ)
16
)
(31)
TCl = (w
C
l , t
C
l ) =
(
u2l
4uh
,
ul(uh − ul))
16uh
)
. (32)
The equilibrium prices are pCh =
2uh−ul
4 , p
C
l =
ul
4 , and the equilibrium demands are D
C
h =
30
1
2 , D
C
l =
1
4 . The equilibrium profit of the upstream supplier is Π
C = µ[4uh+ul(3−4µ)]16 < Π
∗
m.
Such a contract is then strictly dominated by an exclusive contract.
2 Contingent high-quality contract and non-contingent low-
quality contract
Let us consider the case in which U offers a contingent contract to Dh and a non-contingent
contract to Dl. Let TZi ≡ (wZi , tZi ), i = h, l be the equilibrium contracts. Using similar argu-
ments as in (3.3) to determine the outside options for the upstream supplier, the generalized
Nash products turn out to be
NPZh (Th, T
Z
l ) =
[
Πˆ(Th, T
Z
l )− Πˆm(TZl )
]µ
pˆih(Th, w
Z
l )
1−µ, (33)
NPZl (T
Z
h , Tl) =
[
Πˆ(TZh , Tl)−
uh
4
µ
]µ
pˆil(Tl, w
Z
h )
1−µ. (34)
As in (3.3), (33) and (34) are locally concave at the solution of the focs only if µ ≤ 2u2h+2uhul−u2l
4u2h+2uhul−u2l
(otherwise, NPZl (·) is no longer locally concave because D` makes negative profits.) If this
condition holds, standard maximization techniques lead to the following equilibrium contracts
TZh = (w
Z
h , t
Z
h ) =
(
ul
4
,
8µu3h − 4(1 + µ)u2hul + 2(1− µ)uhu2l − (1− µ)u3l
32u2h
)
, (35)
TZl = (w
Z
l , t
Z
l ) =
(
u2l
4uh
,
ul
{
2µ(3− 2µ)u2h + 2[(2− µ)µ− 2]uhul + (1− µ)2u2l
}
32u2h
)
. (36)
Note that as the generalized Nash products NPZh (Th, T
Z
l ) and NP
N
h (Th, T
N
l ) are similar and
do not depend on the fixed fee offered to Dl, then TZh = TNh . Then the equilibrium final good
prices are pZh =
2uh−ul
4 , p
Z
l =
ul
4 , and the equilibrium demands are D
Z
h =
1
2 , D
Z
l =
1
4 . The
equilibrium profits of the upstream supplier is ΠZ =
µ[8u3h+(2−4µ)u2hul−2(µ−1)uhu2l+(µ−1)u3l ]
32u2h
.
If µ >
2u2h+2uhul−u2l
4u2h+2uhul−u2l
, the upstream supplier should adjust downwards the fixed fee in order
to incentivize the low quality firm to sign the contract. Then the optimal contracts are the
solution to
max
wh,th
NPZh (Th, T
Z
l ), maxwl
[Πˆ(TZh , Tl) + pˆil(w
Z
h , Tl)], and pˆil(w
Z
h , Tl)
tl= 0. (37)
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Standard maximization techniques then lead to the optimal contracts
TZh = (w
Z
h , t
Z
h ) =
(
ul
4
,
8µu3h − 4(1 + µ)u2hul + 2(1− µ)uhu2l − (1− µ)u3l
32u2h
)
, (38)
TZl = (w
Z
l , t
Z
l ) =
(
u2l
4uh
,
ul(uh − ul)
16uh
)
. (39)
The equilibrium final good prices and demands are as above, while the equilibrium profits of
the upstream supplier is ΠZ =
ul(2u2h+2uhul−u2l )+µ(2uh+ul)(2uh−ul)2
32u2h
.
Note that as ΠZ < ΠC , a non-contingent contract offered to Dl and a contingent contract
to Dh is strictly dominated by the upstream supplier offering contingent contracts to both
firms.
3 Proof of Lemma 4 part ii)
If U offers a contingent contract to Dl and a non-contingent contract to Dh and moreover,
ul
uh
> 45 and
8u2h−4uhul−u2l
ul(6uh−ul) < µ < 1, in the interior solution the high-quality downstream
firm makes negative profits. The upstream supplier should adjust the fixed fee downwards in
order to incentivize Dh to sign the contract. Equilibrium contracts is then the solution to the
following problem
max
wl,tl
NPMl (T
M
h , Tl), maxwh
[Πˆ(Th, T
M
l ) + pˆih(Th, w
M
l )], and pˆih(Th, w
M
l )
th= 0. (40)
Thus, the equilibrium contracts are
TMh = (w
M
h , t
M
h ) =
(
ul
4
,
uh − ul
4
)
, (41)
TMl = (w
M
l , t
M
l ) =
(
u2l
4uh
,
ul[2µuh − (3− µ)ul]
32uh
)
. (42)
The equilibrium prices are pMh =
2uh−ul
4 , p
M
l =
ul
4 , and the equilibrium demands are D
M
h =
1
2 ,
DMl =
1
4 . The equilibrium profit of the upstream supplier is Π
M =
8u2h−2(2−µ)uhul−(1−µ)u2l
32uh
<
Π∗m. Hence, this pair of contracts is strictly dominated by an exclusive contract offered to the
high-quality firm.
4 Proof of Proposition 1
As we have seen above, some contract configurations are strictly dominated strategies for the
upstream supplier. This is so for those contracts in which the upstream supplier should adjust
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the fixed fee downwards to motivate the high, or the low, quality downstream firm to sign the
contract. These contracts are strictly dominated by an exclusive contract offered to Dh (see
Appendix 1 and 3). In addition, a non-contingent contract offered to Dl and a contingent
contract to Dh is also strictly dominated strategy by contingent contracts offered to both
downstream firms (see Appendix 2).
After the elimination of strictly dominated strategies, we determine the optimal contracts
for the upstream supplier in the first stage by simply comparing its profits at the equilibria
of each subgame
(i) if µ ∈ [0, µ1(r)), then ΠN > max[Π∗m, ΠM , ΠC ],
(ii) if µ ∈ [µ1(r), µ2(r)), then ΠM > max[Π∗m, ΠN , ΠC ],
(iii) if µ ∈ [µ2(r), 34), then ΠC > max[Π∗m, ΠN , ΠM ],
(iv) if µ ∈ [34 , 1], then Π∗m > max[ΠC , ΠN , ΠM ],
with r ≡ uluh , µ1(r) ≡
r(1−r)
(6−r) , µ2(r) ≡ 2(1−r)6−r , and 0 < µ1(r) < µ2(r) <
3
4
.
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